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NOTES

A DISCUSSION OF PENNSYLVANIA PROCEDURAL RULES
229, 230, 231 AND 232
New rules of civil procedure pertaining to the discontinuance and the
nonsuit, their effect on a second action on the same cause of action, and their
effect on a counterclaim of the defendant have been promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania and took effect April 1, 1950. The purpose of this note
is to discuss the change brought about by these rules.
Rule 229 provides:
(a) A discontinuance shall be the exclusive method of voluntary termination of an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff before commencement of the trial.
(b) A discontinuance may not be entered as to less than all defendants
without leave of court after notice to all parties.
(c) The court, upon petition and after notice, may strike off a discontinuance in order to protect the rights of any party from unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense, or prejudice.
It is to be noted that a trial is deemed commenced for the purpose of
this rule when the case is called for actual trial.'
Prior to the promulgation of the present rules, the rule seems to have
been that the plaintiff could discontinue even after the commencement of the
trial. In Kennedy v. McNickle2 it was held that a case could not be discontinued
after final judgment. Lawrence v. Burns3 held that a petition for leave to discontinue came too late when it was presented after a general vtrdict. In Cooper v.
Cooper4 it was held that if no objection is made, a discontinuance may be allowed
at any stage of the proceedings.
Therefore, Rule 229(a) clarifies previous procedure and definitely states the
point after whch a discontinuance may not be taken. In a note by the Procedural
Rules Committee, it is stated, "The nolle prosequi and the retraxit are abolished
by Rules 229(a) and 230(a)."
The prior practice as to a discontinuance where there are two or more
defendants and with regard to the striking off of a discontinuance apparently
has been continued. 5
Rule 231(a) provides that "after a discontinuance . . .the plaintiff may

commence a second action upon the same cause of action upon payment of the
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costs of the former action." This also is a continuation of prior practice. In the case
of Gibson v,Gibson6 the court ruled that a discontinuance of an action, when
made in the ordinary form, is not such a determination thereof as to be a bar
in another action between the same parties on the same cause of action.
Rule 232(a) substantially confirms prior practice. This rule provides "a

discontinuance .. . shall not affect the right of the defendant to proceed with
a counterclaim theretofore filed."
As late as 1945 in the case of Biy v. Bd. of Property, Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 353 Pa. 49, 44 A.2d 250, the court

said that the discontinuance of an action is subject to the consent of the court
and it should not be permitted if prejudicial to the rights of others. In several
other cases the court has ruled to the same effect.7 But the court has also stated

that in practice leave to discontinue is assumed in the first instance without the
formality of an application, i.e., the discontinuance is ordinarily entered without
leave of court actually being obtained, it being presumed to be entered with
such leave. 8 In such an event, however, the presumed leave of court is subject
to be withdrawn. 9 Since the granting of the discontinuance or its withdrawal
was within the discretion of the court, the court could impose conditions thereon,
to wit, that the counterclaim of the defendant should be prosecuted.10
In regard to the rules on discontinuance, one may summarize as follows.
The point is now definitely established after which a party may not discontinue.
Prior practice regarding the commencement of another action on the same
cause of action between the same parties and the prosecution of a counterclaim after a discontinuance has been continued.
Rule 230 brings about a definite departure from prior practice. Rule 230
provides:
(a) A voluntary nonsuit shall be the exclusive method of voluntary
termination of an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff during
the trial.
It is to be noted that this subsection by implication does away with the
petition for a discontinuance during trial.
(b) After a plaintiff has rested his case in chief he may not suffer
a voluntary nonsuit without leave of court and cannot do so after the
close of all the evidence.
6 20 Pa. 9 (1852).
7 Donosa v. Ueltzen, 97 Pa. Super. 556 (1930); Adanm Hat Stores Ine. v. Lefio et al, 317 Pa.
443, 176 A. 734 (1935).
8 Shapiro v. Phila., 306 Pa. 216, 159 A. 29 (1932); See note 5.
9 Comm. to the use of Backingham v. Magee, 224 Pa. 166, 73 A. 346 (1909).
10 Lamb v. Greenhouse, 59 Pa. Super. 329 (1915); Baumgartner v. Whinney, 156 Pa. Super.
167, 39 A.2d 738 (1944).
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Formerly the plaintiff had the absolute right to take a voluntary nonsuit at
any time before verdict was rendered."1 The Act of March 28, 1814, P.L. 248,
12 P.S. 649 provided that "whenever, on the trial of any cause, the jury shall
be ready to give in their verdict, the plaintiff shall not be called, nor shall he
then be permitted to suffer a nonsuit." The courts have declared this rule in
many cases. 12 Under prior practice then, only one situation was possible.
A striking change has been brought about, however, by the promulgation
of Rule 230(b). This subsection creates three periods during which the plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit may be affected. The first of these periods is between the commencement of the tial and the close of the plaintiff's case in
chief. During this period the plaintiff's right to suffer a nonsuit is absolutethe court cannot exercise any discretion in the matter. In this instance, prior
practice has been continued. In the opinion of the writer, there is room for improvement at this point. There are various reasons why the plaintiff may wish
to suffer a voluntary nonsuit. In presenting his case the plaintiff's attorney
may discover that he lacks proof of an essential element, which proof may be available to him, but if he were to continue the case, the verdict should surely go
against him. Or the plaintiff's attorney may fully present all the facts at his
disposal without hope of attaining any more proof on pertinent points. Upon discovering this, but before completion of the case in chief, the attorney may take
a voluntary nonsuit. In both cases, under present rules, the plaintiff is entitled to commence another action on the same cause of action. While this may
be an entirely proper procedure in regard to the first case, it is inexcusable in the
latter. Furthermore, under the present rules, the plaintiff may suffer as many
voluntary nonsuits as he feels is neceskary and thus the harassment of the defendant is further enhanced.
In the opinion of the writer a course of action patterned after the procedure
set forth ih the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be a great improvement over the.present Pennsylvania system. These rules provide that "an action shall
not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. .. "Is (Emphasis supplied).

Rule 41(1) provides in substance that if the plaintiff has once dismissed, a
subsequent dismissal will operate as an adjudication on the merits.
The second period during which the plaintiff's right to take a tionsuit
may be affected is between the dose of his case in chief and the close 6f all
the evidence. The rule provides that the plaintiff cannot suffer a nonsult during
11 It may be noted at this point that Rule 2231(e) protects persons who afe '9c&ndarii liable
by providing that a plaintiff who joins persons who are liable to him in.different capacities
may not suffer a voluntary nonsuit as to the one primarily liable without also suffering it as

to all the others.
12 Felts v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R., 170 Pa. 432, 33 A. 97- ji8954-- Axelrod v.

Howell,
I

28 Pa. 297, 195 A. 879 (1938).

Rule 41(2).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

this period without leave of court. This is a very important change and a vast
improvement over prior practice. Formerly the attorney for the plaintiff could
present his case in chief and then wait to hear the defendant's evidence before
deciding whether he would take a voluntary nonsuit In other words, the P could,
by taking the nonsuit, prevent a decision on the merits (which would be res
judicata) after he heard the defendant's case. Under the present rule, however,
the judge in his discretion may determine the effect of the judgment of nonsuit. I wish to emphasize at this point that the practice under the present rule
places a great deal more responsibility on the plaintiff's attorney. He must decide, before the close of his case in chief, whether he is willing to go to the
jury. A motion for nonsuit after this point may be denied in the discretion of
the court.
The third period during which the plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit may be
affected is after the close of all the evidence. Under the present rule [Rule 230
(b) ], the right to take a nonsuit after the close of all the evidence is absolutely
denied. This could mean that, if at the end of the plaintiff's case in chief, the
defendant was willing to waive his evidence, or if he asked for a directed verdict
and thereby impliedly waived his evidence, the plaintiff could not obtain a
voluntary nonsuit. This is indeed a radical departure from the old rules, and
in view of the trend toward liberality seems to be a strict and arbitrary rule.
Where the defendant asks for a directed verdict it denies the plaintiff the right to
restate his case. It is hoped that in such a situation the trial judge will allow
the plaintiff to reopen his case as if to receive more testimony in order to allow
the plaintiff to be granted a voluntary nonsuit. To do this is within tht" discretion
of the trial judge,"4 and although it would not be within the wording of the
rule, this writer feels that it would be one way to get around a rather bad
situation. For if the trial judge, by the rule, cannot in his discretion grant a
voluntary nonsuit, he must pass upon the motion for the directed verdict, and
a technical error or a mere oversight on the part of the plaintiff's attorney would
be fatal and final.
As stated above, prior to the promulgation of the present rules the plaintiff could take a nonsuit up to the time the jurors were ready to deliver their
verdict.15 The change occasioned by the adoption of the present rule, in this
writer's opinion, instead of improving a poor practice has made it worse. Generally the plaintiff's attorney should realize any weak point of his case before
this point. But should the attorney at this late date find that proof of an essential
allegation is missing, which proof might reasonably be available to him, he should
be allowed to suffer such a nonsuit as would not be prejudicial to his client.
If the nonsuit were not allowed, the effect of a judgment would be res judicata
14 Seaboard Container Corp. v. Rothschild, 359 Pa. 51, 58 A.2d 800 (1948).
15 Cherniak v. Prudential Ins. Co. 339 Pa. 73, 14 A.2d 334 (1940).
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on the cause of action, and a plaintiff with a perfectly good cause of action,
would by a mere technicality, be denied recourse in the courts of justice. It is
submitted, therefore, that the trial judge should be allowed to grant a nonsuit at
this point on such conditions as to him seem proper. If the courts were to
follow the rule that is to be applied regarding nonsuits during the period between the close of the plaintiff's case in chief and all the evidence, the above
described intquitous practice would be remedied, i.e., the judge should have discretion in granting the nonsuit.
It is to be remembered that the purpose of rules of procedure is to bring
about an orderly presentation of a case. But at the same time such rules must
promote and not hinder justice.
With regard to the compulsory nonsuit, the same situation as above described
exists. Prior to April 1, 1950, even though the plaintiff suffered a compulsory
nonsuit, he could bring another action on the same cause of action. Rule 231(b)
provides "after the entry of a compulsory nonsuit the plaintiff may not commence a second action upon the same cause of action." He must pursue the
remedies given under the Act of March 11, 1874, P.L. 6, 1; 12 P.S. 645. (The
right to take off and appeal.) Now the reasons for a compulsory nonsuit, just as
in the case of a voluntary nonsuit, may vary. First, the plaintiff may be nonsuited at the insistance of the defendant because he has failed to prove his case.
Second, the plaintiff may be nonsuited because in his proof he has affirmatively
shown that he has no legitimate cause of action. In the first case the plaintiff
may be able to acquire such proof as is missing; but nevertheless, he is barred from
bringing another action on the same cause of action. It is submitted that the
judge should have the same discretionary power in determining the effect of compulsory nonsuit as was discussed in connection with the voluntary nonsuit.
There remains one final point to be discussed-the effect of a nonsuit on the
prosecution of a counterclaim. The effect of the rules prior to April 1, 1950
may be shown by the case of Duke v. Wagner et ttx. 16 This was an action of
trespass which resulted from a collision between two tractor-trailer trucks. The
defendant had entered a counterclaim for damages to his equipment and for
personal injuries. During the trial the plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit, and the
question was whether the defendant could proceed with his counterclaim. The
plaintiff contended that since the nonsuit was entered, the defendant could not
prosecute the counterclaim, and the court in an opinion by Rupp, J. so ruled.
Unless aithorized by statute, after a voluntary nonsuit by the plaintiff, the defedant is not entitled to proceed with a counterclaim or set-off asserted by
him. 17 The reasoning of Judge Rupp in denying the defendant the right to proceed
with his counterclaim was as follows. The Practice Act of May 14, 1915, P.L.
16 59 D. & C. 569 (1947).
17 See note 5; Severance v. Hayl and Patterson, 115 Pa. Super. 36, 174 A. 787 (1934).
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483, § 14 as amended, 12 P.S. 431, provides that the defendant may counterclaim in an action of assumpsit, and if the plaintiff dismisses or discontinues,
or suffers a voluntary nonsuit, the defendant may proceed with the counterclaim. Section 13 of the above mentioned act as amended by the Act of April 4,
1929, P.L. 140, 12 P.S. 412, permits a counterclaim in an action of trespass.
But nothing is said about proceeding with the counterclaim in case a voluntary
nonsuit is suffered by the plaintiff. Even under the Practice Act of 1915, therefore, it is doubtful whether the defendant would have been permitted to prosecute his counterclaim after the plaintiff took a nonsuit. Rule 1452(1), however,
suspended absolutely sections 13 and 14 of the Practice Act. Lacking statutory
authority, the defendant in the Duke case18 was prevented from proceeding
with his counterclaim.
The question whether the defendant can proceed with his counterclaim or
whether he will be forced to bring a new action is of very great importance in
the situation where the statute of limitations has run. If the period of the statute
has expired between the time of filing the counterclaim and the bringing of the
new action, the defendant will be precluded from bringing a new action. Rule
232(a) remedies this situation by providing ". . . a nonsuit shall not affect the
right of the defendant to proceed with a counterclaim theretofore filed."
In conclusion, it may be stated that while the Rules of Civil Procedure with
regard to the discontinuance, and voluntary and compulsory nonsuits have to some
extent remedied the situation which previously existed, there is indeed room for
vast improvement.
William A. Zeigler
18 See note 16.

